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Blurred lines: Reconsidering the concept of ‘diversion’ in youth justice 
systems in Australia  
Abstract  
This article revisits ‘diversion’ in the context of youth justice in Australia. Although 
‘diversion’ is omnipresent in youth justice, it is rarely subject to critical examination. 
This article raises four interrelated questions: what young people are to be 
‘diverted’ from and to; whether young people are to be ‘diverted’ from the criminal 
justice system or from offending; whether young people are to be ‘diverted’ from 
criminal justice processes or outcomes; and whether ‘diversion’ should be considered 
distinct from crime prevention and early intervention. The article concludes that the 
confusion about youth ‘diversion’ may foster individualised interventions in young 
people’s lives.  
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Introduction  
[W]e need to begin to look at the functions of this practice [‘diversion’]. 
Rather than querying the extent to which it should be modified to bring 
it into line with the aims set out for it, the question is what purpose 
does this policy have (Pratt, 1986: 214)? 
 
On the one hand, there was a scheme which could accurately be 
described as having “diversion” as its aim. Its target population was 
children who would otherwise have been prosecuted. On the other, 
there was a scheme with broader aims, which reached out, both to 
children who would otherwise have been prosecuted and to those who 
were “pre-delinquents”. This distinction...rapidly became blurred 
(Seymour, 1988: 158).  
 
Recent research on youth justice has produced conflicting results about the efficacy of 
‘diversion’ and contrasting views about whether ‘diversion’ should be increased or 
reduced in Western youth justice systems. In relation to the efficacy of ‘diversion’, 
McAra and McVie’s (2007, 2010) research on the Scottish youth justice system found 
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that ‘diversion’ fosters desistence among young offenders. McAra and McVie’s (2010: 
198) data on young offenders, from the Edinburgh Study of Youth Transitions and 
Crime, found that ‘diversion’ of young offenders is vital given that: 
 
The deeper young people who were identified as the usual suspects [ie 
those who ‘become sucked into a repeat cycle of contact with the 
system’] penetrated the youth justice system, the more likely it was 
that their pattern of desistence from involvement in serious offending 
was inhibited [italics in original].   
 
Indeed, McAra and McVie’s (2007: 327) research found that even when controlling for 
a range of relevant variables, the strongest predictor of a young person being charged 
by police during the previous year was having previous police charges: 
 
Children who reported that they had been charged in previous years 
were over seven times more likely to be charged at age 15 than were 
children with no such history – a factor that is completely independent 
4 
 
of their current involvement in serious offending and their more recent 
history of police adversarial contact [italics in original]. 
 
As a result, McAra and McVie (2010: 202) argue that youth justice systems ought to 
‘maximize diversion wherever possible’ (see also Holman and Zeidenberg, 2006). 
 
In contrast, recent Australian research by Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels (2012) 
argues against what they see as the current ‘hands off’ (New South Wales Bureau of 
Crime Statistics and Research, 2011; Wallace and Jacobsen, 2011) approach to youth 
justice in Australia. Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels (2012) found that over half of 
all young people cautioned, conferenced or convicted for the first time in New South 
Wales in 1999 were reconvicted of a further offence during the following 10 years. As 
such, Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels (2012) find the evidence in support youth 
‘diversion’ lacking, and recommend instead an approach to youth justice in which 
young offenders assessed as at risk of reoffending are placed on a treatment program 
designed to address their criminogenic needs. While Weatherburn, McGrath and 
Bartels (2012: 808) acknowledge that such an approach would ‘undoubtedly increase 
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the number of young offenders coming before the Children’s Court’, they argue that 
‘there is no criminological reason to be concerned about such an outcome’.  
Recent scholarship on youth justice also makes competing claims about the capacity of 
the youth justice system to label and stigmatise young people in trouble with the law, 
and based on this, competing arguments about whether ‘diversionary’ measures 
should be expanded or reduced. Jordan and Farrell (2013), drawing heavily on labelling 
theory, argue for an increased role for ‘diversion’ in Victoria’s youth justice system. 
They say: 
  
Born of this theoretical framework centred on the concept of labelling, 
diversion strategies aim to redirect young offenders away from the 
criminal justice system, primarily to avoid the stigmatising and 
criminogenic impacts associated with interactions with the justice 
system....Yet, despite the legal, financial and social benefits of 
diversion...Victoria has not adopted a legislative, court-based diversion 
scheme....This article...proposes a number of means to develop a more 
robust youth diversion scheme for young Victorians (Jordan and Farrell, 
2013: 419-420).  
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In contrast, Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels (2012) assess the evidence in support 
of the capacity of the youth court system to label and stigmatise young people, and 
again find it lacking. As a result, they recommend that policy-makers consider the 
‘abandonment’ of the assumption that ‘contact with the court system increases the 
risk of further offending (ie, is criminogenic)’ (Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels, 
2012: 780). As described above, while Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels (2012: 808) 
recognise that such an ‘abandonment’ would increase the number of young people 
coming before the youth court system, their rejection of labelling theory leads them to 
believe that this outcome is of little concern.  
 
Irrespective of these divergent research findings about the efficacy of ‘diversion’ and 
views about its continued relevance, ‘diversionary’ measures continue to have a 
stronghold in Western criminal justice systems, and in particular, in Western youth 
justice systems. There are certainly competing ideologies that exert an influence on 
youth justice; McAra and McVie (2010: 181-182) argue that a ‘complex and conflicted 
set of logics....an uneasy mixture of welfarist, actuarialist and retributive impulsions’ 
underpin the Scottish youth justice system (see also Muncie, 2011), and the same 
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could be said about youth justice systems in Australia’s eight jurisdictions. 
Nonetheless, ‘diversion’ at both an ideological and a practical level has been a key 
feature of Western youth justice systems in recent decades (see Goldson 2000). A 
number of international frameworks relating to youth justice stress the importance of 
‘diversion’ for young people in trouble with the law. The United Nations Guidelines for 
the prevention of juvenile delinquency (United Nations, 1990: para 58) recommend 
that ‘Law enforcement and other relevant personnel...should be familiar with and use, 
to the maximum extent possible, programmes and referral possibilities for the 
diversion of young people from the justice system’. Similarly, the United Nations 
Standard minimum rules for the administration of juvenile justice (United Nations, 
1985: para 11.1-11.2) recommend that: 
 
Consideration shall be given, wherever appropriate, to dealing with 
juvenile offenders without resorting to formal trial by the competent 
authority....The police, the prosecution or other agencies dealing with 
juvenile cases shall be empowered to dispose of such cases, at their 
discretion, without recourse to formal hearings.  
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At the national level, both the National Youth Policing Model (Attorney-General’s 
Department, 2010) and the National Youth Justice Framework (Australasian Juvenile 
Justice Administrators, forthcoming) include a strong focus on the importance of 
‘diversion’ for young people in trouble with the law. At the jurisdictional level, the 
youth justice system in each state and territory in Australia involves a strong focus on 
‘diversion’, either via legislation or policy (see Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare, 2011; Jordan and Farrell, 2013), although the extent to which various 
‘diversionary’ measures are utilised varies substantially across these jurisdictions (see 
Richards 2010). The Australian Capital Territory even recently developed a standalone 
Diversionary Framework for Youth Justice (see Australian Capital Territory Department 
of Disability, Health and Community Services, 2011). Thus despite Lundman’s (1976: 
437) bleak prediction that ‘this embrace [of ‘diversion’] will be momentary’, it 
continues to underpin many criminal justice measures, especially youth justice 
measures, in the West.     
 
This article revisits the concept of ‘diversion’ in the context of youth justice in 
Australia. As outlined above, ‘diversion’ is omnipresent in this context; however, it is 
rarely subject to critical examination. Rather, it is so taken-for-granted as to be 
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‘invisible’ in the Foucauldian sense; as Hacking (1995: 95) puts it, ‘the sort of thing that 
nobody even asks about’. This article raises a number of key questions about youth 
justice ‘diversion’ in this context. Specifically, in the hopes of reigniting critical 
engagement with the concept of ‘diversion’, it considers the following four interrelated 
questions: what young people are to be ‘diverted’ from and to; whether young people 
are to be ‘diverted’ from the criminal justice system or from offending; whether young 
people are to be ‘diverted’ from criminal justice processes or outcomes; and whether 
‘diversion’ should be reimagined as conceptually distinct from both crime prevention 
and early intervention. This article does not seek to proffer answers to these 
questions. Following Pratt (1986), my aim is not primarily to consider whether 
‘diversion’ is meeting the objectives ascribed to it, but to pose these questions in 
support of a bolder aim: to destabilise and encourage renewed engagement with the 
very purpose of ‘diversion’.   
 
The term ‘diversion’, and associated terms, will be used in inverted commas 
throughout this article in order to remind the reader of the contested and contestable 
nature of this terminology - that ‘diversion’ represents a loose, shifting and unstable 
assemblage of diverse processes, practices, ideologies and theoretical positions. This is 
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in keeping with Foucauldian scholars such as Sutcliffe (2003: 6), who considers this 
strategy ‘not a fad but a necessary device to keep my problematisation of this category 
constantly in the reader’s gaze’.  
 
Destabilising ‘diversion’ 
Considering how ubiquitous the concept is in the youth justice sphere, the lack of a 
cogent definition of ‘diversion’ in this sphere is remarkable. As argued above, the 
taken-for-granted nature of the concept of ‘diversion’ is striking; it is a constant 
feature of criminal justice – especially youth justice – discourse, but is rarely critically 
examined. ‘Diversion’ is a shifting and nebulous entity, and appears to take on various 
meanings in various contexts, at various times, and to various people (see also Cressey 
and McDermott, 1974; Sarri, 1983). Ironically, given concerns about the capacity of 
‘diversionary’ measures to result in net-widening, it seems that the concept itself has 
been the unwitting victim of this phenomenon. Nejelski (1976: 394) drew attention to 
this concern over three decades ago, in the early throes of the ‘diversionary’ 
movement, claiming that ‘the term “diversion”...has been used so often to justify such 
a wide response to children in trouble that it has become a coin of debased value’ (see 
also Cressey and McDermott, 1974). More recent critiques of this nature are far less 
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common; while particular ‘diversionary’ measures are routinely subject to 
criminological attention – particularly evaluation – the concept of ‘diversion’ itself 
receives little attention.    
 
Consider as examples of the varied understandings of ‘diversion’ the following 
definitions: 
 
Diversion is generally understood as any process that prevents a young 
person from entering or continuing in the youth justice system. It is also 
described as removal from criminal justice processing, and, frequently, 
redirection to community support services (Australian Capital Territory 
Department of Disability, Housing and Community Services, nd: 1). 
 
Diversion is defined as the channelling of cases to noncourt institutions, 
in instances where these cases would ordinarily have received an 
adjudicatory (or fact-finding) hearing by a court (Nejelski, 1976: 396). 
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[‘Diversion’ is] a means of diverting eligible offenders from the criminal 
justice system to specific programs that address issues related to 
criminal behaviour (Heseltine and Howells, 2012: 512).  
 
Diversion primarily operates at three levels:  
o crime prevention strategies — which aim to prevent young 
people becoming involved in criminal activity in the first 
instance;  
o diversionary schemes — which aim to divert young 
offenders away from the criminal justice system as early as 
possible; and 
o sentencing options — which aim to divert young people 
away from custodial sentences (Jordan and Farrell, 2013: 
421). 
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[‘Diversion’ is] any process that is used by components of the criminal 
justice system whereby youths avoid formal juvenile court processing 
and adjudication (Roberts cited in Bechard et al., 2011: 607). 
 
These definitions alone raise a number of issues about the precise aims and 
nature of ‘diversion’, which will be addressed in turn below.  
 
What are (young) offenders to be ‘diverted’ from and to? 
First, it is unclear precisely what young people are being ‘diverted’ from and to. In the 
above examples alone, ‘diversion’ is variously constructed as channelling 
offenders from: court, custody, the criminal justice system as a whole, and even 
offending behaviour itself (as discussed in more detail in the following section). 
‘Diversion’ is constructed as channelling offenders to: ‘noncourt institutions’, 
community support services, and treatment programs. While these definitions of 
‘diversion’ may (ostensibly at least) share the aim of reducing young people’s contact 
with the more formal and severe elements of the criminal justice system, they obscure 
important differences among the approaches being advocated. For example, Roberts’ 
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(cited in Bechard et al., 2011: 607) definition of ‘diversion’ as ‘any process...whereby 
youths avoid formal court processing’ categorises a vast array of criminal justice 
measures, such as informal police reprimands, cautions, youth justice conferences and 
drug courts, together as ‘diversionary’ measures.  
 
A critical difference among these measures, however, is that while some (eg drug 
courts, youth justice conferencing) involve the Damocles’ sword of traditional court 
processing, sentencing and penalty, others (eg police reprimands, warnings and 
cautions) do not. In other words, while some of these ‘diversionary’ measures may be 
‘true diversions’ (Cressey and McDermott, 1974) in that they involve simply directing 
the young person out of the criminal justice system with no possibility or threat of 
further contact, others involve the threat of an appearance in a traditional court, and 
the potential consequences of such an appearance, if the young person does not 
comply with the ‘diversion’. As Cressey and McDermott (1974: 3) put it, ‘If "true" 
diversion occurs, the juvenile is safely out of the official realm of the juvenile justice 
system... when he [sic] walks out the door from the person diverting him, he is 
technically free to tell the diverter to go to hell’ (see also Klein, 1979). This distinction 
is important to recognise in light of long-held concerns about the capacity of 
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‘diversionary’ measures to thin the mesh of criminal justice control over young people 
(see eg Clancey and Howard, 2006; McAra and McVie, 2007, 2010).  
 
 Are young people to be ‘diverted’ from the criminal justice system or from offending 
behaviour? 
As noted above, the literature on ‘diversion’ constructs the aim of ‘diversion’ as 
variously channelling young offenders away from the criminal justice system, 
and away from offending behaviour. For example, Jordan and Farrell’s (2013: 
421) definition, reproduced above, claims that ‘diversion’ aims to ‘prevent 
young people becoming involved in criminal activity in the first instance’ as well 
as preventing young people’s contact with the criminal justice system, 
especially custody. Similarly, Zagar, Grove and Busch (2013: 390, 381) discuss 
the ‘challenges of diverting youth from crime while saving detention costs’ and 
‘how to divert youths from violence’.  
 
The National Youth Policing Model (Attorney-General’s Department, 2010), a 
national framework ‘designed to improve the safety and security of the 
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Australian community by reducing the prevalence of unsafe, violent and anti-
social behaviours by young people’ (Attorney-General’s Department, 2010: 2), 
provides numerous examples of this conceptual confusion about whether 
young people are to be ‘diverted’ from the criminal justice system or from 
offending itself (of course these two issues are linked, as will be discussed 
below). The National Youth Policing Model (Attorney-General’s Department, 
2010: 25) states, for example, that ‘South Australia Police has diverted over 
4500 young offenders to access health interventions that assist in addressing 
illicit drug abuse [since 2001]’. Further, South Australia’s ‘Calperum “on the 
land”’ program ‘focuses on enhancing cognitive, life and vocational skills to 
divert young people away from offending behaviours’ (Attorney-General’s 
Department, 2010: 25). The Australian Capital Territory’s ‘Youth Liaison 
Officers’ initiative even aims to ‘refer young people to programs designed to 
divert them from crime and adverse or vulnerable circumstances’ (Attorney-
General’s Department, 2010: 42). Here, rather than being ‘diverted’ from the 
criminal justice system as a whole, or particular elements of the criminal justice 
system (such as custody), young people are to be ‘diverted’ from offending 
itself.  
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Further, ‘diversion’ is constructed in the National Youth Policing Model and 
elsewhere (see eg Roe-Sepowitz et al., 2011; Vodde, 2012) as channelling 
young people away from both offending and reoffending. For example, the 
National Youth Policing Model (Attorney-General’s Department, 2010: 29) goes 
on to describe the aim of Western Australia’s Police Citizens Youth Centres as 
‘to divert young people who have offended from further offending’. Western 
Australia’s Police Citizens Youth Centres ‘Community Service Hours’ initiative is 
described as ‘[building] positive relationships...between the young offender 
and police to assist in diversion from re-offending behaviour’ (Attorney-
General’s Department, 2010: 30). Similarly, Western Australia’s ‘Juvenile and 
Family Fire Awareness (JAFFA)’ program, which targets young people involved 
in arson-related behaviours, is described as ‘an attempt to divert further 
criminal activity’ (Attorney-General’s Department, 2010: 31). Extraordinarily, 
the target of this ‘diversionary’ measure is not a young person at all, but 
‘criminal activity’.  
 
The conceptual confusion as to whether young people are to be ‘diverted’ from the 
criminal justice system or from offending is by no means limited to the National Youth 
18 
 
Policing Model. The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2011: 201) describe 
Victoria’s ‘Youth Justice Housing Pathways Initiative’ as providing ‘support to young 
people involved with the Youth Justice program in an effort to divert young people 
from the youth justice system and to minimise the likelihood of further offending’. 
Similarly, the aim of youth justice conferencing in Queensland is described as ‘to divert 
young people from further offending’ (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 
2011: 203). Again, therefore, ‘diversionary’ measures for young people are variously 
constructed as directing young people away from the criminal justice system, from 
offending behaviour, and from reoffending behaviour.  
 
I want to argue in this article that these two aims – ‘diverting’ young people 
from the criminal justice system, and ‘diverting’ young people from 
(re)offending – need to be disentangled. Of course, offending and contact with 
the criminal justice system are related in that offending or reoffending may 
lead to contact with the criminal justice system. It is important, however, that 
the premise that ‘more offending equals more contact with the criminal justice 
system’ (New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2011: 2) is 
subject to critical examination. While this view may be correct to an extent, it 
overlooks the evidence that some groups of young people come into contact 
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with the criminal justice system not because they offend persistently but 
because they are highly visible to police and other criminal justice authorities 
and come under a high degree of criminal justice scrutiny (see McAra and 
McVie, 2007, 2010). This has been demonstrated to be the case for Indigenous 
young people (Blagg et al., 2005; Cunneen, 2008), culturally and linguistically 
diverse young people (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2010), and young 
people in out-of-home care (McFarlane, 2010), on bail (Richards and Renshaw, 
2013), from non-metropolitan areas (Blagg et al., 2005; Cunneen, 2008; 
Richards and Renshaw, 2013), and from the sex and gender diverse community 
(Dwyer, 2011), among others. Thus while offending behaviour and contact with 
the criminal justice system may be related, the relationship between the two is 
more nuanced than some authors (eg New South Wales Bureau of Crime 
Statistics and Research, 2011; Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels, 2012) 
suggest. It follows that making a conceptual distinction between ‘diverting’ 
young people from offending, and ‘diverting’ young people from the criminal 
justice system, is critical to better understanding and applying the aims of 
‘diversion’.   
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A key point of this article is therefore that we need to disentangle ‘diversion’ 
from the criminal justice system and ‘diversion’ from offending. These are 
historically and conceptually distinct. As argued in more detail below, while 
‘diverting’ young people from the criminal justice system is primarily concerned 
with minimising the potentially adverse consequences of this contact, 
‘diverting’ young people from offending aims primarily to change their 
behaviour. As a result, ‘diversion’ from the criminal justice system and 
‘diversion’ from offending give rise to distinct and discrete responses: to doing 
nothing (or at least doing something less intrusive), and doing something (or 
intervening more intrusively), respectively.  
 
For example, if the aim of ‘diverting’ a young person from the criminal justice 
system is to minimise his/her contact with the potentially stigmatising court 
process, this might give rise to a young person being ‘diverted’ to a caution 
instead, or indeed, being given an informal reprimand by a police officer and 
simply let go or moved on. In contrast, if the aim of ‘diverting’ a young person 
is to change their offending behaviour, this might give rise to a young person 
being placed on an intensive behavioural change program such as an anger 
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management program. ‘Diversion’ from offending may therefore have far more 
intrusive consequences on young people’s lives, and the lives of their families, 
than ‘diversion’ from the criminal justice system. 
 
I do not intend to focus in this article on the concerns associated with the net-
widening and mesh-thinning potential of ‘diversionary’ measures; Cohen 
(1985: 31) delivered a devastating critique of the ‘destructuring impulse’, 
including the shift towards ‘diversionary’ measures, nearly three decades ago 
(see also Polk, 1993; Pratt, 1986; Sarri, 1983). Rather, my more modest point 
here is twofold: firstly that there is a conceptual confusion pervasive in the 
body of literature on youth justice as to whether offenders (especially young 
offenders) are to be ‘diverted’ from the criminal justice system or ‘diverted’ 
from offending; and secondly that this confusion has potentially serious 
consequences, since ‘diverting’ young people from offending may result in 
precisely the problems that ‘diversion’ from the criminal justice system seeks 
to avoid (eg stigmatisation, intrusive intervention in the lives of young people 
and their families).  
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To summarise the argument so far, measures that seek to ‘divert’ young people 
from offending rather than (or in addition to) contact with the criminal justice 
system by intervening in some way risk subjecting young people to high levels 
of criminal justice scrutiny. As Richardson and McSherry (2010: 250) put it, 
‘[While] traditionally the term “diversion” meant diversion out of the criminal 
justice system altogether....the term is now also commonly used to describe 
programs which initially increase contact with the criminal justice system 
through treatment and supervision but which are aimed at reducing contact 
with the criminal justice system over time’. As McAra and McVie’s (2007, 2010) 
work clearly shows, this may be highly counterproductive. As such, while 
intensive intervention in young people’s offending trajectories may be 
warranted in some cases (as Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels (2012) argue), 
a high degree of caution must be exercised in order to prevent young people 
becoming the ‘usual suspects’ (McAra and McVie (2010: 198)).  
 
This issue – whether young people are to be ‘diverted’ from the criminal justice 
system or from offending – raises two further related issues: whether (young) 
offenders are to be ‘diverted’ from criminal justice processes or outcomes; and 
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whether crime prevention, early intervention and ‘diversion’ ought to be 
conceptually distinct from one another. These issues will now be addressed in 
turn.  
 
 Are (young) offenders to be ‘diverted’ from criminal justice processes or outcomes? 
In the preceding section, ‘diversion’ from the criminal justice system and 
‘diversion’ from offending were contrasted. A further conceptual confusion 
that requires academic attention is whether young people are to be ‘diverted’ 
from criminal justice processes or criminal justice outcomes. What does it 
mean to say that we ‘divert’ young people from the ‘criminal justice system’? 
 
There is a great deal of confusion about this in the bodies of literature on 
‘diversion’ and youth justice. Considering again the definitions of ‘diversion’ 
provided above, it is clear from these examples alone that (young) offenders 
who are to be ‘diverted’ from the criminal justice system are variously to be 
‘diverted’ from criminal justice processes (eg arrest, court, prosecution, 
adjudication), and from criminal justice outcomes (eg custody). While Nejelski’s 
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(1976: 396) and Roberts’ (cited in Bechard et al. 2011: 607) definitions clearly 
construct offenders as being ‘diverted’ from court or other adjudicatory 
process, Jordan and Farrell’s (2013: 421) broad-ranging definition includes 
offenders being ‘diverted’ from custodial sentences.   
 
This conceptual confusion is not limited to these examples, but pervades the 
literature on adult and youth ‘diversion’. In some cases, the literature even 
confuses ‘diversion’ from criminal justice processes and outcomes as well as 
‘diversion’ from offending. Vodde’s (2012: 114) definition of ‘diversion 
programs’ in the Encyclopedia of Community Corrections provides perhaps the 
most confused discussion of the aims of ‘diversion’: 
 
[‘Diversion programs’] involve diverting offenders away from the 
criminal justice system towards some form of treatment, remediation, 
and prevention of further criminal behaviour....[T]he courts have 
deemed that diversion programs provide offenders a “second chance” 
by affording them the opportunity to participate in a community-based 
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treatment and supervision program in lieu of being formally processed 
through the court and adjudication system.  
 
Here, the aim of ‘diversion’ is variously portrayed as channelling offenders from 
both criminal justice processes and outcomes, as well as from (re)offending 
itself. These examples demonstrate the amorphous nature of the concept of 
‘diversion’ (see further Richardson and McSherry, 2010), and the multiple 
‘invisible’ aims of ‘diversion’ that the literature frequently obscures. Although 
the literature considers ‘diversion’ from criminal justice processes and 
‘diversion’ from criminal justice outcomes unproblematically, and as though 
these aims are interchangeable, the distinction between the two is an 
important one, and should be subject to critical attention.  
 
A first step towards this might be to consider the rationale for each. As 
considered in more detail below, the notion that young offenders should be 
‘diverted’ from court and other criminal justice processes is at least partly 
premised on labelling theory (Cressey and McDermott, 1974; Lundman, 1976; 
McGrath, 2008; Nejelski, 1976; Polk, 1993; Sarri, 1983; Schwalbe et al., 2012; 
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Vodde, 2012). According to labelling theory, processes such as being charged or 
brought before a court can stigmatise individuals and result in them adopting 
the ‘master status’ of deviant, which in turn may lead to more offending on 
their part (Becker, 1963). While the same concerns might also apply to criminal 
justice outcomes (eg community service orders, custody), there are other 
(arguably far more important) concerns about criminal justice outcomes that 
form key rationales for ‘diversionary’ measures. It has been well-documented 
that youth detention, for example, has a wide range of adverse impacts on 
young people largely unrelated to labelling and stigmatisation. These include: 
separation from family and community (Halsey, 2007); disruptions to education 
and employment (Bailey, 2009); exposure to violence and psychological harm 
(Halsey 2007); and the increased risk of self-harm and suicide (Abram et al., 
2008; Holman and Zeidenberg, 2006). These consequences of incarceration can 
affect certain groups of young people, such as Indigenous young people 
(Australian Capital Territory Human Rights Commission, 2011) , young women 
(Australian Capital Territory Human Rights Commission, 2011), sex and gender 
diverse young people (Curtin, 2002; Estrada and Marksamer, 2006), young 
people with disabilities (Australian Capital Territory Human Rights Commission, 
2011), young people on remand (Bailey, 2009; Goldson and Jamieson, 2002), 
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and young people incarcerated in adult prisons (Murrie et al., 2009), in 
particular. 
 
Thus while there is undoubtedly some overlap in the rationales for ‘diverting’ 
young people from criminal justice processes and from criminal justice 
outcomes, it is important to recognise that to some extent, these aims are 
distinct. To ‘divert’ young people from a criminal justice outcome such as 
detention is to ‘divert’ them from far more tangible harms than those that 
might accompany a criminal justice process (such as court) in and of itself.  
 
It should be acknowledged, of course, that by ‘diverting’ a young person from 
an adjudicatory process, the young person is concomitantly ‘diverted’ from the 
potential consequences or outcomes of that process. For example, in 
Australian jurisdictions, ‘diverting’ a young person from court to a youth justice 
conference simultaneously ‘diverts’ him or her from the potential consequence 
of detention, as youth justice conferences are not legally empowered to 
sentence a young person to detention. It is nonetheless important for 
legislators, policy-makers, researchers and practitioners in the youth justice 
28 
 
sphere to appreciate the historical and conceptual differences between 
‘diverting’ young people from criminal justice processes and ‘diverting’ young 
people from criminal justice outcomes, and to be clear about the rationale(s) 
for each.  
 
Of course, both ‘diversion’ from criminal justice processes and ‘diversion’ from 
criminal justice outcomes share an important aim that is yet to be addressed in 
this article: the prevention of future offending. That is, a key rationale shared 
by measures that seek to ‘divert’ young people from court and those that seek 
to ‘divert’ young people from detention is that these measures will minimise 
the likelihood that the young people ‘diverted’ will offend in future. These 
rationales, in turn, are based on different premises. The notion that ‘diverting’ 
young people from court will minimise the likelihood of future offending is 
based on the premise that court appearances are stigmatising and will result in 
the young person adopting a deviant ‘master status’. In other words, this 
notion is premised primarily on labelling theory. In contrast, the notion that 
‘diverting’ young people from detention will minimise the likelihood of future 
offending is based on the premise that detention is criminogenic in a range of 
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other ways, such as that detention enables young people to form criminal 
associations (see Gatti, Tremblay and Vitaro, 2009; Holman and Zeidenberg, 
2006), and that the disruption to their lives that detention represents leaves 
young people little choice but a life of crime (see generally Holman and 
Zeidenberg, 2006; Soler et al., 2009). Thus while both ‘diverting’ young people 
from criminal justice processes and ‘diverting’ young people from criminal 
justice outcomes may be partly premised on attempts to reduce the likelihood 
of future offending, the mechanics of these two processes are based on 
different assumptions about what causes offending and reoffending.  
 
Perhaps a more subtle and nuanced understanding of ‘diversion’ is therefore required. 
For example, we might consider some ‘diversionary’ measures (such as police warnings 
and cautions) to be ‘diversions’ from the court process, and others (such as youth 
justice conferences and youth drug and alcohol courts) to be ‘diversions’ from 
court outcomes, such as supervision by the youth justice system. Polk (1993: 107) 
adopted a similar approach by distinguishing between measures that aim to limit 
young people’s formal contact with police and courts (the ‘front end’ of the system) 
and those that aim to limit the incarceration of young people. (Polk (1993: 107) refers 
30 
 
to the former as ‘diversion’ and the latter as ‘deinstitutionalisation’ or ‘decarceration’ 
(see also Cressey and McDermott, 1974; Klein, 1979; Seymour, 1988)). It is also worth 
considering whether to an extent, no particular criminal justice process, program or 
practice is intrinsically ‘diversionary’, and depends on whether it is provided as 
an alternative to a more intrusive process, program or practice. It is certainly possible 
that particular criminal justice measures may be ‘diversionary’ for some young people 
but not others. For example, a youth justice conference might represent ‘diversion’ for 
a young person if a children’s court magistrate refers them to it as an alternative to 
placing the young person under youth justice supervision. A youth justice conference 
could not be considered a ‘diversion’, however, for a young person who would 
ordinarily have been cautioned.  
 
Some of the confusion on this point stems from a lack of clarity about the precise 
nature of the relationship between labeling theory and ‘diversion’. While the Jordan 
and Farrell (2013) and Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels (2012) articles introduced 
above make competing recommendations about the role of ‘diversion’ in youth justice 
systems in Australia, they both assume a direct link between labelling theory and 
‘diversion’. This link is rarely critically examined; while labelling theory and ‘diversion’ 
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are clearly related, (as both Jordan and Farrell (2013) and Weatherburn, McGrath and 
Bartels (2012) recognise), the relationship between them requires closer attention.  
 
It should first be recognised that ‘diversionary’ policies and practices are premised on a 
far richer breeding ground than merely labelling theory. While labelling theory 
undoubtedly provided a key theoretical basis for the emergence of ‘diversionary’ 
measures in Western criminal justice systems (Cohen, 1985; Lundman, 1976; Schwalbe 
et al., 2012), ‘diversion’ did not emerge in response to labelling theory alone. Nor can 
the enduring support for ‘diversion’ be reduced to an acceptance of labelling theory 
alone. Rather, in addition to concerns about the labelling and stigmatisation potential 
of the formal criminal justice system, ‘diversion’ emerged in response to concerns 
about the financial cost of the formal criminal justice system (Zagar, Grove and Busch, 
2013) and the benefits to efficiency that might be obtained if trivial cases were 
removed (Pratt, 1986; Sarri, 1983; Seymour, 1988), concerns that formal criminal 
justice measures are not the most beneficial or appropriate for responding to 
(particular types of) offending or (particular categories of) offenders, and in the 
context of the social movement towards decarceration – towards what Cohen (1985: 
31) termed the ‘destructuring impulse’. These three precursors to ‘diversion’ are, of 
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course, interrelated, with the decarceration movement itself stemming partly from 
concerns about the cost and efficacy of traditional criminal justice measures – 
primarily prison (see eg Bechard et al., 2011).  
 
Should ‘diversion’ be conceptually distinct from primary and secondary crime 
prevention and early intervention?  
As argued above, one area of conceptual confusion in relation to youth justice 
‘diversion’ is whether young people are to be ‘diverted’ from the criminal 
justice system or ‘diverted’ from offending. A related confusion in the literature 
on ‘diversion’ is the difference between ‘diversion’ and crime prevention. 
Bechard et al. (2011: 607), for example, claim that ‘one unifying goal of all 
diversion programs is keeping first-time offenders, or otherwise at-risk youth, 
from penetrating further into the justice system’. Jordan and Farrell’s (2013: 
421) definition of ‘diversion’, outlined above, directly equates ‘diversion’ and 
crime prevention: ‘diversion primarily operates at three 
levels...[including]...crime prevention strategies – which aim to prevent young 
people becoming involved in criminal activity in the first instance’. Under the 
heading ‘Non-cautioning diversion programs for low-level youth offending’, 
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Jordan and Farrell (2013: 422) go on to describe Victoria’s Youth Support 
Service in the following terms: ‘The Youth Support Service (‘YSS’) aims to 
prevent young people deemed to be at low risk of offending from entering the 
justice system by addressing the underlying causes of their engagement in 
criminal behaviour’.  
 
The National Youth Policing Model (Attorney-General’s Department 2010) also 
repeatedly confuses the domains of ‘diversion’ and crime prevention. For 
example, we are informed in the Introduction that ‘the Model...advocates 
police participation in prevention and diversion strategies such as education 
and awareness programs’ (Attorney-General’s Department, 2010: 2). Under the 
heading ‘Prevention is better than cure’, the National Youth Policing Model 
(Attorney-General’s Department, 2010: 5) states that ‘although police cannot 
always be involved in community development strategies and social programs 
that aim to prevent crime, these should be facilitated wherever possible’, 
followed by the non sequitur that: ‘Policing initiatives that divert offenders 
from the criminal justice system at a young age are critical’.  
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As discussed above, ‘diversionary’ measures often seek, among other aims, and 
however problematically, to prevent further offending by young people. While 
this might appear to align with the various descriptions of ‘diversion’ outlined 
earlier in this article, an important distinction is that preventing further 
offending is the aim of tertiary, not primary or secondary crime prevention. 
Primary crime prevention aims to stop crime before it occurs by addressing 
social (eg employment, health, education) and/or situational (eg building 
design) factors (Australian Institute of Criminology, 2003). Secondary crime 
prevention measures intervene with individuals and/or communities at high 
risk of becoming involved or entrenched in crime, and tertiary crime 
prevention ‘deals with offending after it has happened’ (Australian Institute of 
Criminology, 2003: 1) and seeks to prevent reoffending. Much youth justice 
literature and policy, including the examples provided above, conflate 
‘diversionary’ measures with primary crime prevention.  
 
In the following extract from a document titled ‘Diversionary Framework for 
Youth Justice – Questions and Answers’, the Australian Capital Territory 
Department of Disability, Health and Community Services (nd: 3) even 
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inexplicably confuses primary, secondary and tertiary crime prevention with 
primary, secondary and tertiary ‘diversion’: 
 
There are three different types of diversion including [sic]:  
 
a. Primary diversion includes services, supports or 
interventions delivered universally across the community, 
or to groups known to be at risk of developing a problem;  
b. Secondary diversion targets groups considered at 
increased risk of a problem, or who are showing early 
signs of the problem and include interventions include 
such as alternate education programs, supported 
accommodation programs, and a range of inter-agency 
programs designed for vulnerable young people; and  
c. Tertiary diversion services are those designed to 
prevent young people, already in contact with part of the 
formal criminal justice system, from becoming further 
36 
 
involved in the criminal justice system and to reduce re-
offending by these young people.  
 
Interestingly, some early literature on ‘diversion’ sought to make clear the 
distinction between ‘diversion’ and crime prevention. For example, Nejelski 
(1976: 396-397) claimed that: 
 
Another way of describing diversion is to emphasize that it is not 
prevention. In diversion, the child has committed an antisocial act 
which could bring him within the court’s jurisdiction; he has been 
designated as an immediate candidate for court adjudication and 
formal processing. In prevention, services are made available to a broad 
range of children (who might in the future commit antisocial acts) to 
keep them from being designated as court clients.  
 
Lundman (1976: 437) even criticised ‘diversion’ on these grounds: ‘diversion 
units operate to prevent or reduce secondary deviation (i.e., recidivism) and 
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thus fail to attend to the causes of the primary deviation which brought the 
juvenile to the attention of the diversion unit’. And Klein (1979: 153) simply 
claims that ‘Diversion means to turn away from, and one cannot turn someone 
away from something toward which he was not already heading’. There is, 
however, little recognition of this distinction in more recent literature on youth 
justice (although see Bechard et al., 2011); the blurred lines between crime 
prevention and ‘diversion’ noted by Seymour (1988: 158) and quoted at the 
beginning of this article, remain blurred.  
 
 
A related confusion is the conflation of ‘diversion’ with early intervention. One 
of the six national strategies outlined in the National Youth Policing Model 
(Attorney-General’s Department, 2010: 7), for example, is ‘Early intervention 
and diversion’, the aim of which is ‘to prevent young people from entering the 
criminal justice system’.  
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To confuse matters further, early intervention and primary crime prevention 
are frequently conflated in the criminological literature. The two are not, 
however, synonymous. As the Australian Institute of Criminology (2003: 1) 
explains, early intervention is typically used to intervene with individuals ‘at 
high risk of embarking on a criminal career’, and therefore aligns with 
secondary rather than primary crime prevention measures. In some ways, early 
intervention is quite opposed to primary crime prevention: early intervention 
targets individuals, whereas primary crime prevention ‘targets’ (or rather is 
applied to) whole communities. Primary crime prevention aims to ensure that 
early intervention is not necessary.  
 
This is a vital distinction to make, as while ‘early intervention’ is seen as entirely benign 
(Goldson, 2000) – to the point that Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels (2012) 
recommend its expansion in place of a continuing adherence to ‘diversion’ in 
Australian youth justice systems – it is individualistic in nature and therefore runs the 
risks of minimising the social determinants of crime (see O’Malley, 1996) and social 
responses to it, responsibilising individual young people and their families, and 
drawing young people unnecessarily into the criminal justice system. This is quite in 
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contrast to primary crime prevention, which by definition does not target individuals. 
Thus although ‘diversion’ is frequently conflated with both crime prevention and early 
intervention, this article posits that these three domains have varied meanings, and 
need to be better disentangled.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has called for greater conceptual clarity around the concept of ‘diversion’ 
and its role in youth justice systems. It has sought to encourage increased academic 
and practitioner engagement with the concept of ‘diversion’, by posing four 
interrelated questions: what young people are to be ‘diverted’ from and to; whether 
young people are to be ‘diverted’ from the criminal justice system or from offending; 
whether young people are to be ‘diverted’ from criminal justice processes or 
outcomes; and whether ‘diversion’ should be reconsidered as conceptually distinct 
from both crime prevention and early intervention. While this article has focused 
predominantly on the Australian context, much of the argument presented here 
undoubtedly also applies to comparable youth justice systems around the globe. 
Further, while the focus here has been on young people, much of the argument may 
be relevant to the adult criminal justice context in Western countries.   
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The concerns about the conceptual confusion around ‘diversion’ outlined in this paper 
are not limited to semantics, but are important to consider if justice is to be achieved 
for young people in a fair and effective way. Currently, the confusion around 
‘diversion’ has led to a plethora of youth justice policies and programs, including those 
used as examples in this article, with unclear rationales and objectives, as well as 
unclear benchmarks for the measurement of their effectiveness. Perhaps most 
importantly, and to put it crudely, youth ‘diversion’ policies and programs need to be 
clear about whether they intend to intervene more or less with young people and their 
families. Currently, the ill-defined ethos of ‘diversion’ is used to legitimise criminal 
justice measures that seek both more and less intervention in young people’s lives. 
 
Further, some iterations of the conceptual confusion identified in this article foster 
individualised notions of justice and individualised interventions in young people’s lives 
– of ‘dealing with delinquents, rather than with delinquency’ (Schur, 1973: 62). While 
this may in some cases be warranted, in other cases it can be highly problematic, and 
have the result of unnecessarily increasing criminal justice control over young people’s 
lives and the lives of their families. In particular, the confusion between crime 
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prevention and ‘diversion’ masks the reality that not enough is being done in Australia 
to prevent crime before it occurs – that is, in the domain of universally applied primary 
crime prevention. Dressing ‘diversion’ up as primary crime prevention – however 
inadvertently - may mean that secondary and tertiary crime prevention measures are 
offered in place of universal service provision. These issues are important to consider 
given the context of neoliberal governance in Australia and other Western countries, 
under which the paradigms of risk and responsibilisation dominate criminal justice 
policy and practice, and ‘prior notions of universality and welfare for all children ‘in 
need’ have retreated into a context of classification, control and correction’ (Muncie, 
2006: 781; italics in original) (see also Muncie, 2011).  
 
This article therefore urges greater conceptual clarity about what ‘diversion’ is 
and is not, who its target population is, what it aims to achieve, and what it can 
be expected to achieve - with ‘what purpose does this policy have (Pratt, 1986: 
214)’? Although some of these questions were raised by scholars earlier in the 
development of ‘diversion’ (see eg Cressy and McDermott, 1974; Nejelski, 
1976; Pratt, 1986; Seymour, 1988), critical academic engagement with 
‘diversion’ has not continued in any meaningful way. It is hoped that such a 
rethinking of the role of ‘diversion’ in the youth justice sphere in particular 
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might result in justice being done for young people and their families in a more 
fair, socially inclusive and effective way.  
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